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# Administration Split on Arms-Treaty Compliance

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WASHINGTON, March 26 — The Reagan Administration is still divided over whether it should dismantle two Poseidon submarines this spring in order to continue to adhere to the provisions of the second treaty on limiting strategic arms, Administration officials said today.

Unless the United States dismantles the submarines, it will breach limits set by the treaty when a new Trident submarine begins sea trials on May 20.

The issue of continued compliance with the treaty and alleged Soviet arms control violations were discussed on Monday at a White House meeting of senior Administration officials. But officials said that no decisions have yet been made.

Administration officials said that the State Department continues to oppose plans to drydock the submarines instead of dismantling them in accordance with treaty procedures, while the Defense Department proposes to simply drydock the vessels.

Although the United States Senate has never approved the 1979 treaty, the Reagan Administration said it would not undercut the agreement as long as the Soviet Union agreed to abide by the same policy. The Administration reaffirmed its commitment last June when it decided to dismantle a Poseidon submarine to remain within the treaty limits.

The Administration, however, has repeatedly charged the Soviet Union with arms-control violations and the question of what to do about the treaty has been linked to the debate within the Administration about how to respond to the purported Soviet violations.

There is general agreement within the Administration that some response is warranted. But officials differ over whether the United States should take steps that run counter to the treaty, as the Defense Department has proposed,

or should adopt measures that are consistent with the 1979 agreement, as the State Department has suggested.

Some officials said, however, that they sense that the weight of opinion in the Administration is moving against continued compliance with the treaty.

A recent Pentagon report notes that the Soviet Union has dismantled 14 Yankee-class submarines to stay within the limits of the first strategic arms treaty and has been withdrawing SS-11 missiles as it has deployed SS-25's to stay within the 1979 treaty.

But the Administration says that the Soviet Union has violated key provisions of both treaties by developing more than one new type of land-based missile, extensively encoding missile signals during tests and constructing an early-warning radar that is not situated on the periphery of the country.

Officials said that a number of retaliatory measures have been discussed.

They said that the Defense Department has stuck by its earlier proposal to replace single-warhead Minuteman 2 missiles with three-warhead Minuteman 3 missiles and drydocking two Poseidon submarines for a year before deciding if they should be refurbished and sent out to sea, at a cost of about \$300 million per submarine.

Those moves would push the United States over a treaty limit on the number of multiple-warhead missiles.

The Defense Department has also proposed encoding American missile signals during tests.

The State Department has suggested proceeding with the Midgetman program to develop a small mobile land-based missile, developing decoys that would be carried by missiles to foil pos-

sible Soviet anti-missile defenses and encoding American electronic signals during missile tests.

Those measures would not violate arms agreements and could be seen as a counter to Soviet mobile missile programs and Soviet efforts in the area of missile defense.

Edward L. Rowny, an arms control adviser to President Reagan and a former arms negotiator, has suggested speeding the development of the advanced cruise missile, a highly classified program, officials said.

Officials said that Central Intelligence Agency officials and Mr. Rowny are concerned about the proposals to encode American missile signals because it cause the United States to lose the moral high ground on the issue and could encourage the Soviet Union to go further in encoding its missile signals.